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KNOWLEDGE, ASSERTION AND 
INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY 
J. Adam CARTER and Emma C. GORDON 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle 
features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four 
claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to 
which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that p. 
Second, we propose that rejecting (KNA-S) is the best way out of the puzzle. Our 
argument to this end appeals to the epistemic value of intellectual humility in social-
epistemic practice. 
KEYWORDS: knowledge, assertion, intellectual humility, epistemic value, social-
epistemic practice 
 
1. Knowledge Norm of Assertion: Sufficiency 
According to proponents of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA), one must 
assert only what one knows.1 Specified this way, KNA is a necessary condition on 
epistemically appropriate assertion.2 Some philosophers, including Keith DeRose,3 
John Hawthorne,4 and Mona Simion5—and debatably Williamson (2000)6—also 
                                                                
1 See, for example, Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 243. 
2 KNA is sometimes defended as a constitutive norm of assertion (e.g., Williamson, Knowledge 
and Its Limits.) A rule is constitutive norm, for a given type of speech act, A, when being 
governed by R is part of what it is to be that kind of speech act, A. 
3 Keith DeRose, The Case for Contextualism: Knowledge, Skepticism and Context (Vol. 1) 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
4 John Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
5 Mona Simion, "Assertion: Knowledge Is Enough," Synthese (forthcoming). 
6 For discussion on this point, see Matthew A. Benton, "Expert Opinion and Second-Hand 
Knowledge," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92, 2 (2016): fn. 3, J. Adam Carter and 
Emma C. Gordon, "Norms of Assertion: The Quantity and Quality of Epistemic Support," 
Philosophia 39, 4 (2011): 615–635, and J. Adam Carter, "Assertion, Uniqueness and Epistemic 
Hypocrisy," Synthese (2015), doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0766-5, §§2-3. 
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embrace a sufficiency version of the norm which, as Jennifer Lackey7 formulates 
it, states:  
(SUFFICIENCY CLAIM) KNA-S: One is properly epistemically positioned to assert 
that p if one knows that p8. 
Of course, KNA-S is compatible with the concession that, often times, you 
should not, all things considered, assert what you know. You might know, for 
example, a secret which you promised not to tell. More mundanely: we know 
many trivial facts which we shouldn’t go around asserting, because they lack 
relevance in the conversational contexts we occupy. As Lackey puts it, the core 
idea driving KNA-S is just that, whenever I assert something that I know to be the 
case, “my knowing that this is the case suffices for my having the epistemic 
credentials to make such an assertion.” Asserting on knowledge, even if doing so is 
subject to various kinds of criticisms, is, epistemically beyond reproach.  
A wide range of objections and alternatives to the necessity formulation of 
KNA have been proposed and discussed since Williamson’s9 influential defense of 
KNA.10 By comparison, it’s been relatively more recently that the sufficiency leg, 
KNA-S, has received critical attention, typically through the form of attempted 
                                                                
7 Jennifer Lackey, "Assertion and Isolated Second-Hand Knowledge," in Assertion: New 
Philosophical Essays, eds. Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 251–276. 
8  As Lackey ("Assertion and Isolated,” 252) summarises the thrust of the idea: “[…] ‘knowledge 
is sufficient for possessing the epistemic authority for assertion even if it is insufficient for 
various other kinds of propriety. For instance, while it may be imprudent, impolite, or pointless 
for me to assert that my colleague behaved foolishly over the weekend, my knowing that this is 
the case suffices for my having the epistemic credentials to make such an assertion.” For a 
helpful overview of recent defenses and challenges to the knowledge norm’s necessity and 
sufficiency formulations, see Matthew A. Benton, "Knowledge Norms," Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (2015), http://www.iep.utm.edu/kn-norms/#SH1d.. 
9 Timothy Williamson, "Knowing and Asserting," Philosophical Review 105, 4 (1996): 489–523. 
10 The two most notable alternative norms defended in the literature are the justification norm 
of assertion (Jennifer Lackey, "Norms of Assertion," Noûs 41, 4 (2007): 594–8211; Igor Douven, 
"Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility," Philosophical Review 115, 4 (2006): 449–485; 
Jonathan Kvanvig, "Assertion, Knowledge and Lotteries," in Williamson on Knowledge, eds. 
Patrick Greenough and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)) and the 
truth norm of assertion (Matthew Weiner, "Must We Know What We Say?," The Philosophical 
Review 114, 2 (2005): 227–251). See Aidan McGlynn, Knowledge First? (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), Ch. 5, for a helpful recent overview of various challenges to the knowledge 
norm of assertion.  
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counterexamples.11 Such counterexamples have attempted to establish that the 
following features can coincide:   
i. the impropriety of an assertion is epistemic, even though 
ii. one plausibly counts as knowing the proposition asserted.  
Perhaps the most promising style of counterexample case against KNA-S, 
plausibly exhibiting features (i) and (ii), features expertise and isolated second-
hand knowledge. Consider, for instances, Lackey’s12 case DOCTOR:  
DOCTOR: Matilda is an oncologist at a teaching hospital who has been diagnosing 
and treating various kinds of cancers for the past fifteen years. One of her 
patients, Derek, was recently referred to her office because he has been 
experiencing intense abdominal pain for a couple of weeks. After requesting an 
ultrasound and MRI, the results of the tests arrived on Matilda’s day off; 
consequently, all of the relevant data were reviewed by Nancy, a competent 
medical student in oncology training at her hospital. Being able to confer for 
only a very brief period of time prior to Derek’s appointment today, Nancy 
communicated to Matilda simply that her diagnosis is pancreatic cancer, without 
offering any of the details of the test results or the reasons underlying her 
conclusion. Shortly thereafter, Matilda had her appointment with Derek, where 
she truly asserts to him purely on the basis of Nancy’s reliable testimony, “I am 
very sorry to tell you this, but you have pancreatic cancer.”  
Lackey insists that in the above case, Matilda knows what she asserts. After 
all, she learned that p from the reliable, undefeated testimony of Nancy, whom 
Matilda rightly regards as a competent testifier on the topic at hand. Denying that 
Matilda knows that p opens the door to testimonial skepticism.13 However, Lackey 
suggests: “The question we must now consider is whether, under these conditions, 
Matilda is properly epistemically positioned to flat out assert to Derek that he has 
pancreatic cancer. And here the answer is clearly no.”14 
Lackey’s rationale here can be put simply: Matilda was not epistemically 
situated to assert that p because, in virtue of Derek’s recognition of Matilda as an 
expert, there are certain epistemic expectations at play that Matilda fails to meet, 
                                                                
11 See Jessica Brown, "The Knowledge Norm for Assertion," Philosophical Issues 18, 1 (2008): 
89–103, for an important early challenge to (KNA-S). 
12 Lackey, "Assertion and Isolated."  
13 The worry here is that if an individual fails to count as acquiring testimonial knowledge in an 
epistemically hospitable circumstance—viz., where she is the recipient of reliable testimony 
from a recognized expert, and in the absence of any defeaters—then the prospects are poor for 
supposing that testimonial knowledge can be acquired in normal circumstances which are 
perhaps less hospitable than this especially friendly case.  
14 Lackey, "Assertion and Isolated," 6. 
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even though she knows (via testimony) what she asserts, expectations in place in 
light of her recognized expertise. Derek would, for instance, plausibly be miffed to 
learn that Matilda had diagnosed him without ever seeing his charts or examining 
him. As Lackey puts it, Derek would be within his rights to expect Matilda to have 
a better cognitive grasp of his medical situation than she actually did. And this 
despite her knowing that what she said was true. 
If the foregoing rationale is correct, then KNA-S is false. It’s not the case 
that one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p so long as one knows 
that p. Along with Lackey, several others have attempted to fashion 
counterexamples to KNA-S along the similar lines.15 We have ourselves in 
previous work16 taken such a line. In doing so, we argued that in cases like 
DOCTOR, the epistemic credential required for epistemically appropriate assertion 
was understanding rather than merely knowledge.17  
In recent work, however, Matthew Benton18 has raised some potential 
problems for the purposes of appealing to DOCTOR-style expertise cases in the 
service of rejecting KNA-S.19 As Benton puts it, “the cases used thus far are 
unstable, and refinements are needed to clarify exactly what principles are being 
tested and exactly what our intuitive judgements are tracking in such cases.” He 
continues:  
. . . do we expect of experts that when speaking as experts they are giving their 
own expert opinion which has been formed by engaging their expertise in a first-
hand manner with the relevant evidence or data? (If we do, is that expectation 
reasonable?)  Do we expect that experts always have an obligation to explain to a 
non-expert what is behind the formation of their opinion? Are there any 
                                                                
15 E. J. Coffman, "Two Claims about Epistemic Propriety," Synthese 181, 3 (2010): 471–488; 
Rachel R. McKinnon, "What I Learned in the Lunch Room about Assertion and Practical 
Reasoning," Logos & Episteme 3, 4 (2012): 565–569; Mikkel Gerken, "Same, Same but Different: 
The Epistemic Norms of Assertion, Action and Practical Reasoning," Philosophical Studies 168, 
3 (2013): 725–744; Adam Green, "Deficient Testimony Is Deficient Teamwork," Episteme 11, 2 
(2014): 213–227. 
16 Carter and Gordon, "Norms of Assertion.” 
17 Jennifer Lackey, "Deficient Testimonial Knowledge," in Knowledge, Virtue and Action: 
Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work, eds. Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (London: 
Routledge, 2013). has indicated that she does not regard understanding as the epistemic 
credential lacking in cases like DOCTOR.  
18 Benton, "Expert Opinion."  
19 Cf., Jennifer Lackey, "Assertion and Expertise," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
92, 2 (2016): 509–517, for a reply to Benton, in which Lackey defends her original 
counterexamples to KNA-S. See also Simion, "Assertion,” for another line of criticism against 
Lackey’s DOCTOR case. 
Knowledge, Assertion and Intellectual Humility 
493 
conditions under which experts may defer to the authority of other experts for a 
second-hand opinion, or a communal consensus, for the purpose of providing 
timely efficient testimony to non-experts? Such questions await further 
investigation. 
We don’t think Benton’s questions pose an insuperable problem to 
defending DOCTOR-style expertise cases as genuine counterexamples to KNA-S.20 
Though these criticisms, we think, invite critics of KNA-S to look beyond 
DOCTOR-style expertise cases in forming the crux of the critical argument. In what 
follows, we want to suggest how considerations to do with epistemic humility 
might support a novel line against KNS-S, one that appeals in some way to 
expertise, but in a very different way than previous arguments in the literature, 
and which are immune from Benton’s criticisms. Setting up the point about 
humility will involve putting several pieces together.  
The first step will be to examine a kind of disagreement pattern that some 
philosophers have taken to recommend epistemic relativism. We want to suggest 
that closer thinking about such cases motivates a puzzle: an inconsistent set of 
claims, one of which is KNA-S. Once the puzzle is set up, we’ll show why, with 
reference to intellectual humility, it’s KNA-S that needs to go. 
2. Deep Disagreements 
Suppose that two individuals, Cat and Kim, disagree about the proposition p: that 
there is a soul that animates the human body.21 Call this their first-order 
disagreement. But suppose their disagreement runs deeper. Cat and Kim also 
disagree about what kind of evidence is even relevant to settling whether p. Kim, 
whose philosophical hero is Jaegwon Kim, thinks that Kim’s analytic philosophy 
of mind is the only kind of authoritative evidence for the truth of p. By contrast, 
Cat thinks that the Cathechism, and only the Cathecism, is an authoritative source 
about p. Call this disagreement about what kind of evidence is relevant to settling 
whether p their second-order disagreement. Define a deep disagreement as a 
disagreement featuring both first- and second-order disagreement.  
Steven Hales22 suggests that in the face of arguments of this form, where the 
disagreement runs at both the first- and second- order, there are five principal 
prospects for resolution: 
i. keep arguing until capitulation; 
                                                                
20 For further discussion on this point, see Carter, "Assertion, Uniqueness."  
21 This case is based (with some amendments) off of Hales' ("Motivations for Relativism as a 
Solution to Disagreements," Philosophy 89 (2014): 63–82) case of ‘Jack and Diane.’ 
22 Ibid. 
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ii. compromise; 
iii. locate an ambiguity or contextual factors; 
iv. accept Pyrrhonian skepticism; 
v. Adopt relativism (e.g. Cat and Kim are ‘both right;’ p is true relative to 
Cat’s perspective, ~p is true relative to Kim’s perspective, and there is 
no further sense in which either is right in a ‘perspective-independent’ 
way.  
Hales, a relativist, opts for (v) (i.e., relativism), though his reasoning for 
reaching the relativist conclusion won’t concern us here.23 What will be relevant 
for our purposes is that Hales thinks that when disagreements are deep in the 
sense described, they are rationally irresolvable in the following sense: they 
constitute dialectical positions from which there simply is no appropriately 
neutral common ground from which either side could rationally persuade the 
other.  
Regardless of whether all deep disagreements (understood as a function of 
first- and second- order disagreement) are rationally irresolvable in Hales’ sense, 
let’s grant Hales that at least some deep disagreements are rationally irresolvable. 
(Of course, it’s a further question whether relativism would be the best conclusion 
to draw from such situations, once the point about rational irresolvability is 
granted24). 
But often times, deep disagreements, which cut at the first- and second- 
order, are not irresolvable. They are simply not resolved and for reasons that can 
be avoided. To appreciate this point, it will be helpful to consider the 
conversational dynamics of deep disagreements.  
                                                                
23 For an extended discussion of this kind of argument for relativism, see J. Adam Carter, 
Metaepistemology and Relativism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), Ch. 4. See also Harvey 
Siegel, "Epistemological Relativism: Arguments Pro and Con," in A Companion to Relativism, 
ed. Steven Hales (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 199–218. for a summary of arguments for 
relativism which take on this dialectical structure; Siegel calls such arguments ‘no neutrality, 
therefore relativism’ arguments.  
24 The most well-known such argument, which appeals to a dialectically entrenched position 
and moves from this position to epistemic relativism, is put forward in Rorty’s Philosophy and 
the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature, where Rorty discusses the famous collision between the opposing ‘epistemic grids’ of 
Galileo and Cardinal Bellarmine. Rorty’s diagnosis of the case is that the matter of who is 
correct with respect to Copernican heliocentrism doesn’t have an absolute answer, but only a 
relative answer. Rorty’s rationale on this point has been a critical focus of anti-relativists, such 
as Paul Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006). See also Carter, 
Metaepistemology and Relativism, Ch. 4.. 
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3. A Puzzle for KNA-S (and a Solution) 
Consider now three dialogues, each which features a deep disagreement in the 
sense articulated in §2. 
Dialogue 1: Cat vs. Kim 
Cat: We’ve both established that we believe different things on this topic. But, 
perhaps we can find a common ground from which rational persuasion is 
possible.  
Kim: Okay, let’s try.  
Cat: Contemporary analytic philosophy of mind, as well as Catholicism have both 
been sources which humans have a history of following on the matter of 
whether there is a soul, do you agree?  
(!) Kim: Yes, but since there is no soul, many of these folks are just wrong.  
Cat: … 
Dialogue 2: Feldman vs. Goldman25 
Feldman We’ve both established that we believe different things on the matter of 
reliabilism versus evidentialism about epistemic justification. But, perhaps we 
can find a common ground from which rational persuasion is possible. 
Goldman Okay, let’s try.  
Feldman Well, to begin with, reliabilism and evidentialism both seem to capture 
something right about the nature of epistemic justification, do you agree?  
(!) Goldman: Yes, but unlike evidentialism, reliabilism is actually true, and so any 
intuitiveness about evidentialism must be compatible with the truth of 
reliabilism. 
Dialogue 3: Doctor vs. Demon Mystic 
Demon Mystic: We’ve both established that we believe different things on the 
matter of whether small pox is the result of a demon. But, perhaps we can find a 
common ground from which rational persuasion is possible.  
Doctor: Okay, let’s try.  
                                                                
25 For Goldman’s and Feldman’s representative views on reliabilism and evidentialism, 
respectively, see for example Alvin Goldman, "What Is Justified Belief?," in Justification and 
Knowledge, ed. George S. Pappas (Dordrecht: Springer, 1979), 1–23; Knowledge in a Social 
World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999); Earl Conee and Richard Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays 
in Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).. 
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Demon Mystic: Well, to begin with, western science and witchcraft have both 
have long histories and have had thousands of practicioners, do you agree? 
(!) Doctor: Yes, but small pox is not the result of a demon.  
Demon Mystic: … 
Now, for some observations about these three dialogues. Firstly, notice that 
there is at least some kind of impropriety (in Dialogue 1-3) to all three of the (!)-
assertions, by Kim, Goldman and the Doctor, respectively. We needn’t take a 
stand on what kind of impropriety just yet. It should be plain enough that in none 
of the asserters, in asserting (!)-style assertions, is being a cooperative speaker in 
the conversational context26. Secondly, some of the (!)-style assertions are known. 
This is obviously the case with the doctor’s (!)-style assertion, in Dialogue 3—viz., 
the doctor’s assertion that small pox is not the result of a demon. Now, according 
to KNA-S, any impropriety of the (!)-assertions simply cannot be epistemic when 
these assertions are known. 
In light of these observations, we want to motivate a puzzle. The puzzle is a 
quadrilemma. Four claims which are independently plausible, but jointly 
inconsistent.  
Quadrilemma 
1) There is an impropriety to the doctor’s (!)-assertion in Dialogue 3 
2) The doctor’s (!)-assertion in Dialogue 3 is known. 
3) The impropriety of the doctor’s (!)-assertion in Dialogue 3 is epistemic. 
4) (KNA-S): One is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one 
knows that p. 
We take it that a proponent of KNA-S is going to accept both (1) and (2), as 
we do, but then reject (3) while maintaining (4). Our strategy is different. Our 
way out of the puzzle will be to reject (4), viz., to show that it is KNA-S, rather 
than the claim that the impropriety of the doctor’s (!)-assertion in Dialogue 3 is 
epistemic, that must go. So, it is incumbent upon us to provide a good reason to 
think that (3) is true. 
So why should the impropriety of the doctor’s assertion in Dialogue 3 be 
regarded as epistemic rather than mereley something else? After all, the agent 
                                                                
26 Compare here with Mikkel Gerken, "Discursive Justification and Skepticism," Synthese 189, 2 
(2012): 373–394, that in some conversational contexts, dogmatic assertions—viz., assertions 
which the asserter refuses to back up with reasons—are inappropriate in virtue of not being, in 
the conversational context, appropriately cooperative.  
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clearly knows what she asserts, even if the assertion seems to beg the question. An 
answer to this question—and thus to our way out of the puzzle—involves some set 
up. Let’s begin with an analogy. 
Consider that in some dialectical contexts, it can be both practically as well 
as epistemically rational to assume things we don’t actually know. Take first 
practical rationality: relative to the practical goal of distributing justice in a fairest 
possible way, it’s best to begin by assuming the accused party is innocent. 
Correspondingly, if the practical aim is fair distribution of justice, the policy of 
assuming at the outset that the accused is guilty, and must prove her innocence, is 
practically criticizable. 
But assuming things we don’t know can be rational in a way that’s not 
merely practical, as it is in the case of distributive justice. It can also be 
epistemically rational to assume things we don’t know. Here is a standard 
example, familiar from recent discussions of the factivity of understanding in 
epistemology. As Elgin27 has argued, often times, assuming or taking for granted a 
literally false scientific idealization can be instrumental in the facilitation of 
scientific understanding.28 The case she offers to this effect is the ideal gas law, 
which it is advantageous to take for granted despite its falsity in order to 
understand the physical behavior of gas. Note that, relative to our epistemic aims 
(e.g. facilitating understanding), a policy of refraining from utilising idealisations 
in this way is epistemically criticizable. This is so even though what the ideal gas 
law claims is not true. 
Think of bracketing what you do know as the inverse counterpoint to 
assuming what you don’t know. We want to now suggest a parallel. We’ve just 
outlined how that it can be both practically as well as epistemically rational to 
assume things we don’t know (and, correspondingly, it can in such circumstances 
be either practically and/or epistemically criticisable to not assume things we 
don’t know). Likewise, as the parallel goes, it can be both practically as well as 
epistemically rational to bracket—i.e., literally, to not assert29—things we do 
                                                                
27 Catherine Z. Elgin, "Is Understanding Factive?," in Epistemic Value, eds. Adrian Haddock, 
Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
28 For a similar recent argument to this effect, see Benjamin T. Rancourt, "Better Understanding 
Through Falsehood," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (2015), DOI: 10.1111/papq.12134. 
29 Bracketing a claim, p, in a context, C, involves at least not asserting p in C. Note that we are 
not maintaining the stronger claim that it is epistemically criticisable in the context of deep 
disagreements to fail to bracket in a stronger sense, where a failure to bracket a claim p is 
unpacked as a failure to suspend judgment about p. For a recent discussion on the relationship 
between suspending judgment and inquiry, see Jane Friedman, "Why Suspend Judging?," Noûs 
(forthcoming). 
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know (and, correspondingly, it can in such circumstances be epistemically 
criticisable to not bracket (e.g. literally, to assert) things we do know. 
A practical case to illustrate this point will easy to generate. Relative to the 
practical goal of not offending someone, it’s best to not assert your knowledge that 
that person is mentally slow. (Correspondingly: relative to the practical goal of not 
offending someone, the policy of asserting your knowledge that the person is 
mentally slow is practically criticisable). 
We want to suggest that we need to look no further than Dialogue 3 for a 
case where it’s epistemically criticisable to not bracket (literally, to assert) what 
one does know, precisely because it’s epistemically appropriate to bracket what 
you know.  
Consider that, in Elgin’s case of the ideal gas law, assuming what we don’t 
know can, in certain contexts, help facilitate an overarching epistemic good: 
understanding. This is why the practice of assuming false idealizations in science is 
an epistemically advantageous practice; this practice helps facilitate our 
overarching epistemic goals, which is why refraining from utilizing idealizations 
in this way is epistemically criticisible. 
Consider now the following question: can the practice of bracketing 
(e.g., literally not asserting knowledge) in a given circumstance, C, be a not merely 
practically, but also an epistemically rational practice, one which is required to 
facilitate overarching epistemic goals? If so, then by parity of reasoning, refraining 
from not asserting knowledge (e.g. literally asserting knowledge) in such 
circumstances is epistemically criticisable. We shall now sketch an affirmative 
answer to this question. 
To this end, recall the remark at the end of §2—thus far not yet defended—
that often times, deep disagreements (in the sense intimated by Hales, are not 
irresolvable, despite neither party making any headway. Rather, we suggested, 
many such disagreements are simply not resolved and for reasons that can be 
avoided. We’re now in a position to put together some pieces to show how this is 
so, and in a way that we think reveals why asserting knowledge in certain 
circumstances can be epistemically criticisable.  
Specifically, what we want to suggest is that at least some deep 
disagreements can avoid being such that they are never resolved by the parties 
involved precisely by both parties embracing a kind of epistemic humility, where 
each agrees to attempt to locate appropriately neutral (and discriminatory) 
common ground (i.e. the kind common ground by appeal to which rational 
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persuasion is possible).30 Intellectual humility, like humility more generally, 
involves, as Kallestrup and Pritchard31 put it, a kind of “[…] act or posture of 
lowering oneself in relation to others.” One way to do this is to set aside what one 
regards as one’s epistemic entitlement to assert what one knows in the attempt to 
find common ground. Such an attempt requires, specifically, that we must bracket 
(i.e. literally, not assert) certain things we know, when doing so undermines 
mutually beneficial efforts to establish appropriately neutral common ground. 
To bring this idea into sharp relief, compare now two practices which we 
can call, for convenience sake, anti-epistemic humility and epistemic humility, 
each of which is a possible strategy we might employ when making speech-act 
moves within a deep disagreement.  
PRACTICE 1: ANTI-EPISTEMIC HUMILITY: In circumstances where deep disagreement 
persists, don’t refrain from asserting what you know just because doing so would 
contravene the possibility of locating appropriately neutral common ground.  
PRACTICE 2: EPISTEMIC HUMILITY In circumstances where deep disagreement 
persists, refrain from asserting what you know to the extent that asserting what 
you know contravenes the possibility of locating appropriately neutral common 
ground. 
Let’s return to the setting of Dialogue 3—featuring the doctor and the 
mystic, and compare the efficacy of Practices 1 and 3, respectively, beginning with 
Practice 1. A first observation is that Practice 1 already seems to be in full effect; 
the doctor simply asserted that small pox is not caused by a demon, while fully 
aware that this is not something that the mystic interlocutor in light of her 
commitments is in a position to rationally accept. As the doctor is well aware, 
from the mystic interlocutor’s perspective, the natural next move will be to simply 
deny what the doctor has just asserted, and each side will be no closer to any 
possibility of resolution than before. Let’s consider some further things the doctor, 
employing Practice 1 might knowledgably assert. “Demons cause no diseases; the 
small pox demon you believe in does not exist and so therefore lacks causal 
powers; the wider epistemic practice you subscribe to, one which adverts to 
demonic explanations, is epistemically inferior to—and much worse at tracking 
                                                                
30 For some helpful recent discussions on epistemic humility, see Jason Baehr, The Inquiring 
Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Allan Hazlett, "Higher-Order Epistemic 
Attitudes and Intellectual Humility," Episteme 9, 3 (2012): 205–223. and Jesper Kallestrup and 
Duncan Pritchard, "From Epistemic Anti-Individualism to Intellectual Humility," eds. John 
Greco and Eleanore Stump, Res Publica, Philosophy and Theology of Intellectual Humility 
(forthcoming). 
31 Kallestrup and Pritchard, "From Epistemic Anti-Individualism."  
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the truth than—Western science.” Each of these knowledgeable assertions 
contravenes the possibility of finding common ground, and thus contravenes the 
possibility of rational persuasion, by simply inviting the interlocutor to deny, from 
her epistemic perspective, each statement in turn.  
The result of employing Practice 1 is thus that cases like Dialogues 1-3 in §3 
really are in practice irresolvable in that the conversational dynamics of 
disagreements which embrace Practice 1 take patterns that move away from a 
potential scenario wherein both parties walk away believing truly.  
By contrast, Practice 2, unlike Practice 1, offers a different possibility. 
Suppose the doctor (fully cognizant that demons cannot cause small pox), 
appreciates that asserting this knowledge is utterly hopeless vis-à-vis the aim of 
bringing the mystic interlocutor around to a true belief. The doctor, embracing 
Practice 2, accordingly brackets this knowledge, and further, refrains from 
asserting other items of information the doctor knows but which the doctor also 
has reason to believe the mystic interlocutor will, from within her own 
perspective simply deny. Instead, the doctor investigates what points of agreement 
can be found, including simple laws of logic, such as non-contradiction, modus 
ponens, and basic epistemic principles such as what Boghossian32 calls 
‘observation,’ viz., that one is prima facie epistemically justified in believing the 
appearances of perception.  
We don’t purport to embrace unrealistic optimism here. Again, we grant 
Hales’ point that in some, and perhaps even many, circumstances where 
individuals begin by embracing epistemically antipodal positions, an attempt to 
find some Archimedean epistemic norm from which rational persuasion is possible 
will simply not transpire. This can be for a number of reasons: cognitive biases, 
lack of endurance, or—perhaps—there is no appropriately neutral epistemic norm 
available to each which appropriately discriminates between the two rival 
positions. For example, it might be that in Dialogue 3, both the doctor and the 
mystic discover that they can both non-question-beggingly appeal to the 
proposition that the tautological inference rule (A, therefore, A) is truth-
preserving. Though it might also be that in virtue of the utter neutrality of such a 
rule, it cannot be used in the service of rationally advancing either position over 
the other.33  
It is with all of these concessions in mind that we want to maintain that 
Practice 2 is nonetheless epistemically advantageous in light of (unlike Practice 1) 
not foreclosing the possibility of rational resolution, whereby both sides end up 
                                                                
32 Boghossian, Fear of Knowledge. 
33 See Carter, Metaepistemology and Relativism, Ch. 4, for a sustained discussion of this issue. 
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believing truly. The problem with Practice 1, as we’ve seen, is that if rational were 
possible—and so if it were possible that the doctor could employ a practice which 
would facilitate the mystic’s eventually forming a true belief about the origins of 
small pox—Practice 1 would prevent this from transpiring.  
Putting all of this together, a simple rationale materialises for why the 
impropriety of the doctor’s (!)-assertion in Dialogue 3 is epistemic.34 Its 
impropriety is epistemic because, as we hope to have now shown, in short: 
following the assertive practice characteristic of Practice 1, rather than Practice 2, 
is epistemically criticisable. Deep disagreements pursued via the anti-epistemic 
humility policy are genuinely irresolvable. The strategy guarantees deadlocks 
which foreclose the possibility of rational truth acquisition with respect to the 
target proposition. Deep disagreements pursued via the epistemic humility policy, 
one which encourages bracketing rather than asserting one’s knowledge in certain 
circumstances, needn’t be irresolvable. They might be result in both sides 
ultimately believing what’s true. 
To the extent that this foregoing is on the right track, we are in a position 
now to agree with the proponent of KNA-S that claims (1) and (2) of the 
quadrilemma are true. However, we have good reason now to embrace (3). And 
                                                                
34 We wish to here raise and address a potential line of objection, which proceeds as follows: our 
quadrilemma (and in particular, our suggestion that (2) and (4) conflict with (3)), depends on a 
contested conflation of two kinds of epistemic impropriety which should be kept separate. One 
the one hand, there are epistemic assessments which hinge on consequentialist considerations 
about what epistemic goods one will attain by asserting, and on the other hand, there are 
epistemic evaluations we want to make based on whether one is well-positioned enough, given 
one's current epistemic state, to assert. As this line of objection goes, (2) and (4) conflict with (3) 
only if the kind of cases we’ve offered have established epistemic impropriety in the latter sense. 
But, we’ve only established epistemic impropriety in the former sense. Therefore, (2) and (4) are 
not incompatible with (3). In response, we submit that while the doctor’s assertion in Case 3 is 
criticisable on consequentialist grounds, it is not criticisable only on consequentialist grounds. 
We have also suggested the doctor is not well-positioned enough, given the doctor’s current 
epistemic standing and the epistemic standing of her interlocutors, to assert what she does. If 
epistemic impropriety of an assertion should be sensitive only the two-place relation between 
an individual and her current epistemic position, then the doctor’s assertion would not be 
epistemically improper, or criticisable (and thus (3) would not be in tension with (2) and (4) of 
the quadrilemma. However, if the epistemic impropriety of an assertion should be a matter of a 
three-place relation between an individual and her current epistemic position and the epistemic 
position of her interlocutors, then she is. We have attempted to motivate the latter picture as at 
least a viable way of thinking about epistemic impropriety of assertion as the more traditional 
two-place relation picture. And so we are submitting a rationale on which (2) and (4) are 
genuinely in tension with (3). Thanks to Aidan McGlynn for pressing us on this point. 
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(1-3) entail that we must give up (4), the claim that one is properly epistemically 
positioned to assert that p if one knows that p (KNA-S). 
Quadrilemma (resolved) 
(1). There is an impropriety to the doctor’s (!)-assertion in Dialogue 3  
(2). The doctor’s (!)-assertion in Dialogue 3 is known.  
(3). The impropriety of the doctor’s (!)-assertion in Dialogue 3 is epistemic.  
(4). KNA-S: One is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows 
that p. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Our previous35 argument against (KNA-S) submitted that the epistemic credential 
that’s missing in cases of expert testimony on the basis of isolated second-hand 
knowledge (i.e., such as DOCTOR) is understanding, and that understanding of the 
sort that’s needed to assert in such a circumstances is not entailed by the 
possession of any particular items of propositional knowledge. Though we are still 
optimistic that the previous argument succeeds, or could succeed with some 
further modification in light of recent challenges from Benton36 our aim here has 
been to pursue a different strategy altogether, one which challenges (KNA-S) by 
drawing from considerations to do with the social-epistemic value of humility as 
opposed to expertise. We’ve suggested that (KNA-S) is false precisely because 
certain conversational contexts featuring deep disagreements are ones where 
asserting one’s knowledge is criticisable in a distinctly epistemic way. Our 
argument to this effect reveals how it is that engaging in the best kind (e.g. most 
truth-conducive kind) of social epistemic practices requires that we embrace, in 
certain circumstances, a kind of epistemic humility whereby we deliberately 
refrain from asserting what we know.37 
                                                                
35 Carter and Gordon, "Norms of Assertion.” 
36 Benton, "Expert Opinion.” 
37 Thanks to Jesper Kallestrup, Duncan Pritchard and Aidan McGlynn for helpful comments on 
a previous draft. This paper has benefitted from two grants awarded by the Templeton 
Foundation—the ‘Intellectual Humility MOOC’ (Gordon) and ‘Philosophy, Science and 
Religion Online’ project (Carter) hosted at the University of Edinburgh’s Eidyn research centre.  
